Harvest Now, Decrypt Later: Why Your Cryptographic Inventory Can't Wait Until 2030
Attackers can copy encrypted
data today and keep it until a quantum computer is powerful enough to break the
public-key algorithms that protect it. That is "harvest now, decrypt
later", and it is why the EU's post-quantum roadmap puts the first steps,
including an inventory of where cryptography is used, at the end of 2026 rather
than 2030.
If your data has to stay
confidential for ten years or more, the risk already applies to you.
|
Key Facts ·
The EU's
Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) was published in June 2025 by the NIS Cooperation Group. ·
By the end of
2026, first steps should be under way, including inventories of cryptographic
assets. ·
By the end of
2030, high-risk use cases should be quantum-safe; the roadmap says
quantum-vulnerable public-key mechanisms should not be used on their own
after that. ·
By the end of
2035, the transition should cover as many systems as feasible. ·
NIST published
the first PQC standards, FIPS 203, 204 and 205, in August 2024. |
What does "harvest now, decrypt later" mean for your data?
It means the confidentiality of
data you send today depends on cryptography that may be broken tomorrow. The
question is not when quantum computers arrive, but how long your data must stay
secret. Contracts, health records, intellectual property and customer data
often need protection for a decade or longer, so they are exposed now if they
travel over quantum-vulnerable connections.
Why start with a cryptographic inventory?
You cannot migrate what you
cannot see. Cryptography sits in TLS connections, VPNs, certificates, code
signing, databases, backups, cloud services and connected devices, and much of
it comes from suppliers.
A useful inventory records, for
each use: the algorithm and key length, where it runs, who owns it, what data
it protects, how long that data must stay confidential, and which supplier
controls the change.
How do you build one without stalling the business?
1. Start
with the data that must stay secret longest, and trace the systems and
connections it passes through.
2. Automate
discovery of certificates, TLS configurations and libraries instead of relying
on spreadsheets alone.
3. Ask
suppliers for their PQC plans and add them to your third-party risk management reviews.
4. Prioritise
migration work by data lifetime and exposure, and design for crypto-agility so
algorithms can be swapped without rebuilding systems.
We help organisations map and
classify sensitive information through data discovery and classification and broader data
protection work, which gives the inventory its starting point.
Frequently asked questions
Can quantum computers break today's encryption yet?
No quantum computer capable of
breaking widely used public-key cryptography is publicly known to exist. The
concern is data stolen now and decrypted later.
Is AES encryption also at risk?
The main risk is to public-key
algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Symmetric encryption
with sufficiently long keys, such as AES-256, is considered far less exposed.
What are FIPS 203, 204 and 205?
They are NIST's first
post-quantum standards: ML-KEM for key establishment, and ML-DSA and SLH-DSA
for digital signatures.
What to do next
2030 sounds far away, but
inventories, supplier changes and testing take years. Starting the inventory
now gives you a realistic migration plan instead of a rushed one. Talk to us
about a cybersecurity risk assessment that includes
your cryptographic exposure.

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